The Qur’anic Root N H Y

1. Forms and derivatives

N H Y consists of nūn, hāʾ, and yāʾ and is a final-weak root whose third radical is yāʾ. That radical becomes alif maqṣūrah in some forms, including نَهَىٰ and اِنْتَهَىٰ.

Important Arabic forms in this family include:

• نَهَىٰ ـ يَنْهَىٰ: Restrained someone from performing an action or forbade it.
• نَهْي: Restraining or forbidding, opposed to أَمْر, commanding an action.
• نَاهٍ: One who restrains or forbids another person.
• نُهَاة: A plural of نَاهٍ: those who restrain.
• اِنْتَهَىٰ ـ يَنْتَهِي: Desisted from an action, or reached an end, limit, or destination.
• اِنْتِهَاء: Desisting, ending, or reaching a limit.
• مُنْتَهٍ: Someone who has desisted or stopped continuing an action.
• مُنْتَهَىٰ: An end, endpoint, destination, or point reached by something.
• تَنَاهَىٰ ـ يَتَنَاهَىٰ: Reached an endpoint; desisted; in a reciprocal construction, restrained one another.
• تَنَاهِي: Reaching an end or stopping, according to the construction.
• نِهَايَة: An end, conclusion, or final boundary.
• نُهْيَة: Reason or intellect, especially through assessment and restraint of wrongful conduct.
• نُهَىٰ: Reason or understandings; in established usage, the plural of نُهْيَة.
• أَنْهَىٰ: Conveyed something, such as news or a message, to its destination.
• إِنْهَاء: Conveying, communicating, or bringing to an end.
• نَاهِيَة: Something or someone that restrains; in some uses, restraining power.
• نَهْيَة / نِهَايَة: In lexical usage, the boundary or endpoint of something.
• نِهْي / نَهْي: In a terrain-related use, a pool or place where water gathers and ceases to flow onward.

Seven morphological groups from this family occur in the Qur’an:

Together, these forms account for 56 occurrences in 54 verses.

Two verses, Al-Mujādilah 58:8 and Al-Ḥashr 59:7, each contain two words from the root.

The difference between the word count and verse count thus results from its repetition in those two verses.

Quranic Arabic Corpus: 56 occurrences in seven morphological groups

2. The semantic core and witnesses from early Arabic

An endpoint and reaching a boundary

In Maqāyīs al-Lughah, Ibn Fāris identifies one semantic basis for the root:

أَصْلٌ صَحِيحٌ يَدُلُّ عَلَى غَايَةٍ وَبُلُوغٍ

aṣlun ṣaḥīḥun yadullu ʿalā ghāyatin wa-bulūghin

Meaning: “A sound basis denoting an endpoint and reaching.”

He treats nihāyah as the endpoint of anything and explains أَنْهَيْتُ إِلَيْهِ الْخَبَرَ as conveying news to a person.

He then considers نَهَيْتُهُ عَنِ الشَّيْءِ within the same field: when someone is restrained from an action and stops, that conduct’s continuation ends.

This explains the connection between prohibition, stopping, and an endpoint.

Ibn Fāris’s proposed semantic basis must nevertheless be distinguished from the definite history of word formation. This explanation alone does not establish that nihāyah necessarily preceded the verb “forbid” at the earliest stage of Arabic.

The evidence clearly supports a real semantic proximity between these meanings in Arabic.

Maqāyīs al-Lughah and Lisān al-ʿArab: endpoint, restraint, and stopping

Nahā: restraining another person from an action

In Al-Ṣiḥāḥ, Al-Jawharī places nahy in opposition to amr, commanding.

أَمَرَهُ بِالشَّيْءِ means commanding someone to perform an action.

نَهَاهُ عَنِ الشَّيْءِ means restraining someone from performing it.

The prepositions matter in these two constructions.

أَمَرَ بِـ directs conduct toward performing an action.

نَهَىٰ عَنْ turns someone away from an action or forbids its continuation.

Not every prohibition necessarily comes from God, however.

God, a prophet, parents, a member of society, or even an unjust person may forbid another person from doing something.

The verb nahā itself therefore establishes neither the command’s rightness nor the authority of the person issuing it.

Assessment requires asking who restrains whom, from what, and by what right.

Intahā: refraining and desisting

In nahāhu, one person restrains another.

In intahā, the focus falls on the person who stops continuing an action.

This distinction is particularly important in the Qur’an.

Nahā concerns the act of restraining.

Intahā concerns stopping, refraining, or ending that conduct.

Someone may be forbidden by another person yet continue the action.

In that case, prohibition has occurred, but desisting has not.

Forbidding and responding to prohibition are therefore not one event.

A witness from Ziyād ibn Zayd al-ʿUdhrī’s poetry

In Lisān al-ʿArab, quoting Sībawayh, this verse is attributed to Ziyād ibn Zayd al-ʿUdhrī:

إِذَا مَا انْتَهَىٰ عِلْمِي تَنَاهَيْتُ عِنْدَهُ
أَطَالَ فَأَمْلَىٰ أَوْ تَنَاهَىٰ فَأُقْصِرَا

idhā mā intahā ʿilmī tanāhaytu ʿindahu / aṭāla fa-amlā aw tanāhā fa-aqṣarā

Meaning: “Where my knowledge reaches its limit, there I stop—whether it extends and continues, or reaches its end and is cut short.”

Intahā here describes knowledge reaching its boundary; tanāhaytu describes the person stopping at that limit.

The witness is clear in meaning.

The poet says that when his knowledge reaches its limit, he refrains from claiming to know more.

Intihāʾ here does not name a religious prohibition; it concerns reaching the boundary of knowledge and stopping there.

Tanāhā in this verse likewise concerns the person’s own restraint, rather than forbidding others.

This example shows that forms of the root can highlight ending or restraining according to the sentence’s construction.

Sharḥ Abyāt Sībawayh: knowledge extending and stopping at its limit

Nihāyah: the end and final boundary

In Arabic, نِهَايَةُ الشَّيْءِ denotes the end or final part of something.

That end may be spatial, temporal, or conceptual.

A road may have an endpoint, speech may come to an end, and someone’s ability may reach its limit in an action.

These uses do not all necessarily involve a command from another person.

Nihāyah is therefore semantically related to forbidding, but does not itself mean the command “do not.”

Nihy: where water stops flowing

Dictionaries record nihy, and nahy in some dialects, for a pool or water-collecting place.

Al-Jawharī explains that some Arabs of Najd use the word for a pool in which water gathers.

Water here reaches a place where it remains or ceases to flow onward.

Arabic poetry also uses this name for pools and places where water collects.

This branch shows stopping and reaching an endpoint in descriptions of natural phenomena too.

Nihy meaning a pool does not occur in the Qur’an, however.

Water or a pool should therefore not be imported into al-nuhā in Ṭā Hā or al-muntahā in Al-Najm.

Al-Ṣiḥāḥ: a pool, an endpoint, and conveying

Nuhā: reason and the ability to restrain

Lisān al-ʿArab records nuhyah as reason and treats al-nuhā as its plural.

The familiar lexical explanation is that reason restrains a person from ugly and wrongful conduct.

This is not merely an additional ethical value; it connects with nahy’s central meaning.

A person of understanding can foresee consequences, assess words and actions, and stop before an action whose wrongness has become clear.

This relationship does not mean that reason is solely a prohibiting force.

Reason also functions in knowledge, assessment, decision, and choice.

Restraint is one prominent quality reflected in the name nuhā.

A witness from Al-Khansāʾ’s poetry

Al-Khansāʾ, the well-known poet who lived across the pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods, says in praise of a person:

فَتًى كَانَ ذَا حِلْمٍ أَصِيلٍ وَنُهْيَةٍ
إِذَا مَا الْحُبَا مِنْ طَائِفِ الْجَهْلِ حُلَّتْ

fatan kāna dhā ḥilmin aṣīlin wa-nuhyatin / idhā mā al-ḥubā min ṭāʾifi al-jahli ḥullat

Meaning: “A young man of firmly rooted forbearance and understanding, when a surge of ignorant passion loosened the ties of self-restraint.”

Nuhyah appears alongside ḥilm in this verse.

Ḥilm here concerns forbearance and self-restraint.

Nuhyah is the understanding that guards a person against wrongful conduct and its consequences.

Al-Ṣiḥāḥ and Lisān al-ʿArab: the wrapping used in sitting and loosening its tie

This witness shows nuhyah as reason or intellect in early Arabic poetry, rather than merely a prohibitive command.

The verse has variant transmissions. The wording quoted here follows the N H Y entry of Lisān al-ʿArab: al-ḥubā…ḥullat, referring to ties being loosened, not al-ḥijā…ḥallat. Other collected versions use tuʾadah in place of nuhyah; the lexical witness and the variants must remain distinguishable.

Lisān al-ʿArab, N H Y: Al-Khansāʾ’s verse with al-ḥubā…ḥullat

3. Forbidding in the Qur’an: who restrains, and from what?

Divine prohibition of wrongful conduct

One of the clearest occurrences is Al-Naḥl 16:90.

Verse text:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ وَإِيتَاءِ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَيَنْهَىٰ عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ وَالْبَغْيِ يَعِظُكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَذَكَّرُونَ

inna Allāha yaʾmuru bi-al-ʿadli wa-al-iḥsāni wa-ītāʾi dhī al-qurbā wa-yanhā ʿani al-faḥshāʾi wa-al-munkari wa-al-baghyi yaʿiẓukum laʿallakum tadhakkarūna

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“The God commands justice, doing good, and giving to relatives, and forbids indecency, wrongdoing, and oppression. He admonishes you so that you may remember.”

Yaʾmuru and yanhā stand opposite one another in this verse.

The command concerns justice, doing good, and giving relatives their due.

The prohibition concerns indecency, wrongdoing, and aggression.

This contrast shows that conduct’s direction matters: people are called toward right action and restrained from wrongful conduct.

Nahā itself does not mean indecency or wrongdoing, however.

It expresses only the act of restraining; the following nouns identify what is forbidden.

Commanding right and restraining wrong

Text of Āl ʿImrān 3:104:

وَلْتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ

wa-ltakun minkum ummatun yadʿūna ilā al-khayri wa-yaʾmurūna bi-al-maʿrūfi wa-yanhawna ʿani al-munkari wa-ulāʾika humu al-mufliḥūna

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Let there be among you a community inviting to good, commanding what is right, and restraining what is wrong; they are the successful.”

The verse brings together three actions: inviting to good, commanding right, and restraining wrong.

Restraining wrong is thus part of social responsibility directed toward good in this context.

The verb يَنْهَوْنَ alone does not fully establish how that responsibility is to be carried out.

In different circumstances, the verb may involve speech, warning, counsel, requesting reform, or other legitimate means of restraint.

The word itself does not grant unlimited permission for coercion, humiliation, violence, or intrusion into people’s privacy.

Determining the methods and limits of social responsibility also requires examining verses concerning justice, freedom of belief, prohibition of aggression, and the duty to convey the message.

For example, Al-Baqarah 2:256 denies compulsion in religion, while Al-Naḥl 16:125 connects invitation with wisdom and good counsel.

Restraining wrong should therefore not be separated from good and justice.

A shared responsibility, rather than one class’s exclusive privilege

Commanding right and restraining wrong appear together in Āl ʿImrān 3:104, Āl ʿImrān 3:110, Āl ʿImrān 3:114, Al-Tawbah 9:71, Al-Ḥajj 22:41, and Luqmān 31:17.

These uses do not attribute the responsibility solely to a particular class of religious leaders.

In Luqmān 31:17, Luqmān advises his child to establish ṣalāh, command right, restrain wrong, and endure difficulties.

Al-Tawbah 9:71 presents believing men and women together, with commanding right and restraining wrong among their characteristics.

Al-Tawbah 9:112 likewise includes النَّاهُونَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ, those who restrain wrong, among believers’ qualities.

These occurrences identify restraining wrongdoing as an ethical and social responsibility.

Yet a person does not acquire authority merely by forbidding another person.

The rightness of a prohibition is assessed through its subject, evidence, and method.

Restraining what is right is also possible

Text of Al-Tawbah 9:67:

الْمُنَافِقُونَ وَالْمُنَافِقَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ مِنْ بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمُنْكَرِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَقْبِضُونَ أَيْدِيَهُمْ نَسُوا اللَّهَ فَنَسِيَهُمْ إِنَّ الْمُنَافِقِينَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ

al-munāfiqūna wa-al-munāfiqātu baʿḍuhum min baʿḍin yaʾmurūna bi-al-munkari wa-yanhawna ʿani al-maʿrūfi wa-yaqbiḍūna aydiyahum nasū Allāha fa-nasiyahum inna al-munāfiqīna humu al-fāsiqūna

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Hypocritical men and women belong with one another: they command wrong, restrain right, and close their hands. They forgot The God, so He left them aside. The hypocrites are the defiant.”

The verb يَنْهَوْنَ describes condemned conduct here.

The hypocrites restrain what is right.

This occurrence is especially significant because it shows that forbidding is not inherently good.

Someone may restrain people from right action.

The value of restraint therefore does not arise from the verb itself, but from what the person wants others to avoid.

This distinction prevents every prohibitive instruction from being treated as divine law or ethical conduct merely because of its restrictive form.

Prohibition in the speech of prophets’ opponents

In Hūd 11:62, Ṣāliḥ’s opponents say:

“أَتَنْهَانَا أَنْ نَعْبُدَ مَا يَعْبُدُ آبَاؤُنَا.”

Meaning: “Do you forbid us to worship what our fathers worshipped?”

In Al-Ḥijr 15:70, Lot’s opponents also speak of forbidding.

In the account of Adam and his wife, Satan gives a deceptive explanation of God’s prohibition concerning the tree in Al-Aʿrāf 7:20; in Al-Aʿrāf 7:22, God recalls His earlier prohibition.

These cases show prohibition in the dialogue of different speakers: divine prohibition, prophetic prohibition, and the claims or objections of opponents.

Issuing a prohibition must therefore be distinguished from another person reporting it.

In Adam’s account, Satan’s explanation of the reason for God’s prohibition is not God’s own statement.

In Ṣāliḥ’s account, the opponents’ objection likewise does not validate their understanding of the prophet’s invitation.

Restraining wrong and the responsibility of scholars

Al-Māʾidah 5:63 asks why religious scholars and learned authorities do not restrain people from sinful speech and consuming unlawful wealth.

Al-Aʿrāf 7:165 places those who restrain evil among those saved in the account.

Hūd 11:116 also criticizes the absence of groups restraining corruption among earlier communities.

These verses show that silence before clearly wrongful conduct can itself be an ethical issue.

Identifying wrong and corruption nevertheless requires evidence.

If someone declares something forbidden or wrong without evidence, these verses do not authorize imposing that claim.

Al-Tawbah 9:67 has also shown that restraint may be directed wrongly.

The criterion is therefore the truth and justice of the subject, rather than mere power or religious title.

Prohibition of harmful secret conversation

Al-Mujādilah 58:8 describes people forbidden from secret conversation who returned to it, conversing secretly about sin, aggression, and disobedience to the messenger.

N H Y occurs twice in this verse.

Its repetition shows the relationship between prohibition and returning to prohibited conduct.

The prohibition here concerns harmful conduct in private conversation.

The verse does not establish that every private or confidential conversation is forbidden.

Al-Mujādilah 58:9 describes another kind of secret conversation, concerning goodness and mindfulness.

Secrecy alone is therefore not the criterion of wrongness.

Prohibition in human speech and conduct

Al-Anʿām 6:26 contains two verbs close in sound: يَنْهَوْنَ and يَنْأَوْنَ.

The first belongs to N H Y and concerns restraining others.

The second belongs to N ʾ Y and concerns withdrawing and keeping a distance.

They should not be treated as one derivative because of their written and phonetic resemblance.

In Hūd 11:88, Shuʿayb also says that he does not wish to turn himself toward what he forbids others.

This usage emphasizes consistency between speech and conduct.

Al-ʿAlaq 96:9 and Al-ʿAlaq 96:10 also describe someone restraining a servant while performing ṣalāh.

Nahā may therefore be used against a good action too.

This again shows that forbidding alone is no criterion of rightful authority.

4. Prohibition and inward restraint

Ṣalāh restrains indecency and wrongdoing

Text of Al-ʿAnkabūt 29:45:

اتْلُ مَا أُوحِيَ إِلَيْكَ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَأَقِمِ الصَّلَاةَ إِنَّ الصَّلَاةَ تَنْهَىٰ عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ وَلَذِكْرُ اللَّهِ أَكْبَرُ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ مَا تَصْنَعُونَ

utlu mā ūḥiya ilayka mina al-kitābi wa-aqimi al-ṣalāta inna al-ṣalāta tanhā ʿani al-faḥshāʾi wa-al-munkari wa-la-dhikru Allāhi akbaru wa-Allāhu yaʿlamu mā taṣnaʿūna

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Recite what has been revealed to you of the Book and establish ṣalāh. Ṣalāh restrains indecency and wrongdoing; remembrance of The God is greater, and The God knows what you do.”

In this verse, ṣalāh itself is the subject of تَنْهَىٰ.

This differs from cases where one person forbids another.

Ṣalāh is presented as something with a restraining effect.

Tanhā therefore does not mean that ṣalāh issues a verbal command.

It concerns ṣalāh’s restraining function and effect in relation to indecency and wrongdoing.

The verse speaks of establishing ṣalāh, rather than merely claiming religious affiliation or performing movements without attention to meaning and conduct.

Nor does the verse explain the precise mechanism of this restraint.

It does not establish that anyone who performs some form of ṣalāh becomes incapable of any wrongful action.

The verse states ṣalāh’s function and direction; assessing its realization in people’s lives is a different matter.

Does restraint mean compulsion?

In الصَّلَاةَ تَنْهَىٰ, nahy means restraining wrongful conduct.

The verb alone does not establish that ṣalāh removes human will and choice.

Reason can likewise restrain harmful conduct, yet someone may act against their own rational judgment.

Ṣalāh’s restraint should similarly not be turned into mechanical compulsion without evidence.

The central point is that ṣalāh should affect a person’s ethical life and distance them from indecency and wrongdoing.

This meaning connects with other verses concerning remembrance, mindfulness, and practical responsibility.

Al-Ṭabarī: transmitted explanations of ṣalāh’s restraint

Restraining the self from wrongful desire

Text of Al-Nāziʿāt 79:40:

وَأَمَّا مَنْ خَافَ مَقَامَ رَبِّهِ وَنَهَى النَّفْسَ عَنِ الْهَوَىٰ

wa-ammā man khāfa maqāma rabbihi wa-nahā al-nafsa ʿani al-hawā

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“As for the one who feared standing before their Lord and restrained the self from desire,”

Nahā here concerns restraining the self.

The subject is a person restraining the self from following desire.

This usage is semantically close to reason’s role within the nuhā family.

A person may have a desire yet decide not to pursue it after assessment.

Nahā here does not mean eliminating every natural human desire and need.

Al-hawā belongs to another root and must be examined through its own family’s contexts and uses.

Restraint here concerns checking the self and preventing a wrongful course.

It does not establish that every human inclination—even for food, affection, peace, or beauty—is inherently forbidden.

The subject is following a desire set in opposition to reverence for the Lord.

5. Tanāhā and intahā: from mutual restraint to desisting

Lā yatanāhawna: not restraining one another

Text of Al-Māʾidah 5:79:

كَانُوا لَا يَتَنَاهَوْنَ عَنْ مُنْكَرٍ فَعَلُوهُ لَبِئْسَ مَا كَانُوا يَفْعَلُونَ

kānū lā yatanāhawna ʿan munkarin faʿalūhu la-biʾsa mā kānū yafʿalūna

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“They did not restrain one another from the wrong they were doing. Evil indeed was what they used to do.”

يَتَنَاهَوْنَ belongs to Form VI.

One established function of this form is reciprocal action between people.

Lexicographers accordingly explain تَنَاهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ as people restraining one another from wrong.

Early sources also offer another explanation: tanāhā may mean the people themselves desisting.

Al-Ṭabarī discusses both aspects in his commentary: they neither desisted from wrong themselves nor restrained one another from it.

Structurally, mutual restraint is prominent in yatanāhawna.

Its connection with not desisting from wrongful conduct can nevertheless also be understood from context.

This distinction shows that seeing Form VI alone does not justify eliminating every other semantic possibility without examining actual usage.

Al-Ṭabarī: neither desisting nor restraining one another

Responsibility toward wrongdoing

Al-Māʾidah 5:79 concerns more than committing wrong.

The absence of restraint among people is also condemned.

This relates to Hūd 11:116, which discusses the absence of people restraining corruption among earlier communities.

Such responsibility must nevertheless involve a sound understanding of wrong and legitimate methods of reform.

Calling everything one dislikes “wrong” does not itself create a divine ruling.

Restraining wrong should also not become conduct that itself produces injustice and corruption.

Fa-in intahaw: stopping conflict and aggression

In Al-Baqarah 2:192 and Al-Baqarah 2:193, intahaw appears in the context of conflict, fighting, and an end to persecution or turmoil.

In Al-Baqarah 2:192, desisting is paired with God’s forgiveness and mercy.

In Al-Baqarah 2:193, once the opposing party desists, further aggression is denied except against wrongdoers.

Intahaw here concerns stopping and desisting.

It remains necessary to identify what the people desist from.

The subject comes from the context of war and turmoil, rather than intahā alone.

Ending war should therefore not be restricted solely to people changing belief without examining the context.

N H Y itself does not mean war; warfare and fighting come from other words in the verse.

Desisting from usury

After discussing the prohibition of usury, Al-Baqarah 2:275 describes someone who receives admonition from their Lord and فَانْتَهَىٰ, then desists.

Intihāʾ here concerns stopping usurious conduct.

This shows that responding to prohibition goes beyond saying that one has heard the command.

The person must stop the conduct addressed by the warning.

Subsequent verses connect turning away from usury with retaining the principal and relinquishing the wrongful additional demand.

Desisting thus has a practical meaning in this context.

Fa-hal antum muntahūn: a question about desisting

Text of Al-Māʾidah 5:91:

إِنَّمَا يُرِيدُ الشَّيْطَانُ أَنْ يُوقِعَ بَيْنَكُمُ الْعَدَاوَةَ وَالْبَغْضَاءَ فِي الْخَمْرِ وَالْمَيْسِرِ وَيَصُدَّكُمْ عَنْ ذِكْرِ اللَّهِ وَعَنِ الصَّلَاةِ فَهَلْ أَنْتُمْ مُنْتَهُونَ

innamā yurīdu al-shayṭānu an yūqiʿa baynakumu al-ʿadāwata wa-al-baghḍāʾa fī al-khamri wa-al-maysiri wa-yaṣuddakum ʿan dhikri Allāhi wa-ʿani al-ṣalāti fa-hal antum muntahūna

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Satan only seeks through intoxicants and gambling to create hostility and hatred among you and to turn you away from remembrance of The God and from ṣalāh. Will you then desist?”

Muntahūn is a Form VIII active participle.

It refers to people who desist from something or stop.

After describing the consequences of intoxicants and gambling, the Qur’an asks whether its audience will desist.

Rhetorically, the question may function as a warning and serious call to stop.

Morphologically, however, muntahūn simply means those who desist; it is not the name of a punishment or a special group.

The same verse also includes يَصُدَّكُمْ, from Ṣ D D.

That verb concerns turning people away from remembrance of God and ṣalāh, but differs in root from muntahūn.

These families should not be identified merely because of semantic proximity.

Intahaw in threatening speech

Not every Qur’anic intihāʾ is God’s command or a rightful invitation.

In Maryam 19:46, Abraham’s father threatens to stone him unless he desists.

In Al-Shuʿarāʾ 26:116, Noah’s people threaten that he will be among those stoned unless he desists.

In Al-Shuʿarāʾ 26:167, Lot’s opponents likewise threaten expulsion.

In Yā Sīn 36:18, the messengers face threats of stoning and punishment.

Intahā retains the meaning of desisting and stopping in these cases.

The speaker of the threat, however, wants the prophet or messenger to cease the invitation.

Desisting is therefore not always a virtue: someone may abandon truth just as they may desist from injustice.

These examples show that desisting itself is ethically neutral; its value depends on what a person leaves behind.

Other Qur’anic uses of intihāʾ

The sixteen verbal occurrences of intahā appear in these verses:

Al-Baqarah 2:192, Al-Baqarah 2:193, Al-Baqarah 2:275; Al-Nisāʾ 4:171; Al-Māʾidah 5:73; Al-Anfāl 8:19, Al-Anfāl 8:38, Al-Anfāl 8:39; Al-Tawbah 9:12; Maryam 19:46; Al-Shuʿarāʾ 26:116, Al-Shuʿarāʾ 26:167; Al-Aḥzāb 33:60; Yā Sīn 36:18; Al-Ḥashr 59:7; and Al-ʿAlaq 96:15.

Stopping or desisting is present in every instance.

What is abandoned differs: usurious conduct, a doctrinal statement, hostility and conflict, harmful conduct, or the conduct targeted by threats and opposition to prophetic invitation.

These distinctions must be preserved in each verse’s translation.

6. Al-nuhā and al-muntahā: reason and an endpoint

Ulū al-nuhā: people of understanding

Text of Ṭā Hā 20:54:

كُلُوا وَارْعَوْا أَنْعَامَكُمْ إِنَّ فِي ذَٰلِكَ لَآيَاتٍ لِأُولِي النُّهَىٰ

kulū wa-irʿaw anʿāmakum inna fī dhālika la-āyātin li-ulī al-nuhā

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Eat and pasture your livestock. In these are signs for people of understanding.”

Al-nuhā here means reason or understanding.

Ulī denotes possessors or people endowed with something.

Ulū al-nuhā therefore means people of understanding.

Why does the Qur’an use a root here that also concerns forbidding and restraint?

Lexicographers explain that reason restrains wrongful conduct and harmful consequences.

The context mentions the earth’s blessings, food, and grazing livestock.

People of understanding can therefore reflect on these phenomena and recognize their signs.

Nuhā here is not merely refraining from sin; discernment and reflection are present too.

Ulī al-nuhā in learning from history

Text of Ṭā Hā 20:128:

أَفَلَمْ يَهْدِ لَهُمْ كَمْ أَهْلَكْنَا قَبْلَهُمْ مِنَ الْقُرُونِ يَمْشُونَ فِي مَسَاكِنِهِمْ إِنَّ فِي ذَٰلِكَ لَآيَاتٍ لِأُولِي النُّهَىٰ

a-fa-lam yahdi lahum kam ahlaknā qablahum mina al-qurūni yamshūna fī masākinihim inna fī dhālika la-āyātin li-ulī al-nuhā

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Has it not become clear to them how many generations We destroyed before them, while they walk among their dwellings? In these are signs for people of understanding.”

Ulī al-nuhā appears here too.

Its subject differs, however, from Ṭā Hā 20:54.

There, natural phenomena and provision were discussed.

Here, attention turns to earlier generations and their surviving traces.

These uses show nuhā as reason and assessment functioning in both observing nature and understanding history.

A person of understanding does more than collect information: what is seen and known is used for discernment and reforming conduct.

Al-muntahā: the endpoint and final outcome

Text of Al-Najm 53:42:

وَأَنَّ إِلَىٰ رَبِّكَ الْمُنْتَهَىٰ

wa-anna ilā rabbika al-muntahā

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“And to your Lord is the endpoint and final outcome.”

Al-muntahā here denotes an end or ultimate destination.

Its structure belongs to the intahā family.

Some morphological analyses classify it as a passive participle; in semantic use it may approach a place noun, destination, or mīm-prefixed verbal noun.

Differences in morphological terminology should not become an artificial disagreement over the verse’s clear meaning.

Al-muntahā here concerns an endpoint and final outcome.

This fits the surah’s context of responsibility, action, and affairs returning to God.

Al-Ṭabarī: the endpoint and return of creation

Sidrat al-muntahā

Text of Al-Najm 53:14:

عِنْدَ سِدْرَةِ الْمُنْتَهَىٰ

ʿinda sidrati al-muntahā

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“Near the lote tree of the utmost boundary.”

Al-muntahā appears here with sidrah, the lote tree.

Its lexical meaning concerns an endpoint and final boundary.

The root alone cannot establish the tree’s form, physical location, numerical height, or cosmological structure.

Nor need al-muntahā here mean the ending of all human or created knowledge unless independent evidence supports that reading.

The word clearly means an endpoint; its particular referent requires examination within the relevant verses’ context.

Muntahāhā: its endpoint or end

Text of Al-Nāziʿāt 79:44:

إِلَىٰ رَبِّكَ مُنْتَهَاهَا

ilā rabbika muntahāhā

Proposed Persian translation, rendered here in English:

“To your Lord is its endpoint.”

The preceding verses concern a question about the Hour and its timing.

The pronoun hā therefore refers to that Hour.

Muntahāhā concerns its endpoint and final outcome.

Exegetical explanations also connect this expression with God’s knowledge of the Hour’s timing.

The word’s lexical meaning must nevertheless be distinguished from what the surrounding context conveys.

Muntahā itself denotes an endpoint; its relationship with the Lord’s knowledge and authority comes from the verse’s construction and adjacent verses.

Al-Ṭabarī: the Hour’s endpoint and the Lord’s knowledge

7. Distinctions from related roots

N H Y and ʾ M R: restraining and commanding

Study of ʾ M R

Amara, as applied to conduct, concerns commanding an action.

Nahā concerns restraining an action.

The two appear together in Al-Naḥl 16:90 and the verses of commanding right and restraining wrong.

Neither verb inherently establishes that its subject is right.

A person may command wrong and restrain right, as Al-Tawbah 9:67 states.

N H Y and M N ʿ: forbidding and preventing

Study of M N ʿ

Manaʿa concerns preventing or obstructing.

Nahā likewise expresses restraint, but in ordinary use may involve a command, warning, or speech.

Someone may forbid another person from an action yet be unable physically to stop it.

Prohibition therefore relates to practical prevention, but does not always mean applying restraining force.

N H Y and K F F: desisting and refraining

Kaffa concerns restraining and refraining.

Dictionaries explain intahā with kaffa.

The two are close in the sense of desisting.

The N H Y family also includes other uses, such as nuhā for reason and muntahā for an endpoint.

N H Y and Ḥ R M: prohibition and declaring forbidden

Study of Ḥ R M

Ḥarrama concerns making something forbidden or prohibited.

Nahā may likewise restrain prohibited conduct.

Linguistically, forbidding does not always mean issuing a divinely binding prohibition.

In Maryam 19:46, for example, Abraham’s father demands that he desist and threatens him; this does not make the command a legitimate divine ruling.

Questions of permissibility and prohibition therefore require identifying the source, audience, subject, and scope of a prohibition.

N H Y and Z J R: restraining and rebuking

Zajara concerns restraining accompanied by driving away or rebuking.

Nahā may involve counsel or warning, but the force of rebuke is not inherent in it.

Every prohibition therefore cannot be translated as aggression or threat.

N H Y and R D ʿ: restraining and checking

Radaʿa concerns preventing and checking conduct.

Nahā lies in the same field.

Radʿ may emphasize an action’s deterrent effect, while nahy may denote the command or request to stop an action.

This distinction matters in studying methods of social reform.

N H Y and ʿ Q L: reason and the ability to restrain

Study of ʿ Q L

ʿAql’s semantic field involves binding and restraining.

Nuhā likewise names reason because it restrains wrongful conduct.

The families are semantically close.

Conceptual proximity should not become a claim that both historically arose from one root.

N H Y and L B B: reason and deep understanding

Study of L B B

Lubb and its plural albāb also denote reason and understanding in the Qur’an.

Ulū al-albāb and ulū al-nuhā both refer to people of understanding.

Nuhā, through its root, highlights reason’s restraining role.

Lubb belongs to another semantic family requiring independent examination.

N H Y and N ʾ Y: forbidding and withdrawing

Nahā belongs to N H Y.

Naʾā belongs to N ʾ Y and means withdrawing or moving away.

Al-Anʿām 6:26 places يَنْهَوْنَ and يَنْأَوْنَ together.

They are close in sound but belong to two different roots.

Root study therefore cannot rely solely on written resemblance; the original radicals and precise morphology must be examined.

8. Challenges of interpretation and semantic development

Is every prohibition religiously binding?

No.

Nahā expresses restraint, while a command’s authority comes from its speaker and evidence.

God forbidding an action differs from an unjust person forbidding right conduct.

The Qur’an includes divine and prophetic prohibition, prohibition by prophets’ opponents, and hypocrites restraining what is right.

The mere presence of a prohibitive verb therefore does not establish a prohibition’s rightfulness.

Does commanding right and restraining wrong permit religious coercion?

The root itself grants no such permission.

Prohibition may involve awareness, counsel, presenting evidence, and asking someone to stop.

Turning it into unlimited power to impose belief, intrude into private life, or punish others requires independent evidence.

The Qur’an pairs invitation and conveying the message with the absence of compulsion in religion.

Nahy’s lexical meaning therefore does not replace examining rights and the limits of social action.

Does intahā always mean desisting from something bad?

No.

In Al-Baqarah 2:275, it concerns desisting from usury.

In Maryam 19:46, however, Abraham’s father demands that he abandon his invitation.

In Al-Shuʿarāʾ 26:116 and Al-Shuʿarāʾ 26:167, prophets’ opponents also threaten them to desist.

The value of desisting therefore depends on its subject.

Is nuhā solely a prohibiting force?

No.

Human reason may restrain, but knowledge, assessment, and choice are also among its functions.

In Ṭā Hā 20:54, people of understanding reflect on signs in creation.

In Ṭā Hā 20:128, they learn from earlier generations’ history.

The restraining role therefore does not erase reason’s other functions.

Is al-muntahā always a temporal ending?

No.

An end may be temporal, spatial, or conceptual.

In Al-Najm 53:42, the endpoint is attributed to the Lord.

In Al-Najm 53:14, al-muntahā appears in a construction concerning the lote tree.

Al-Nāziʿāt 79:44 concerns the Hour’s endpoint.

It is therefore necessary to identify what reaches an end and the construction in which muntahā appears.

9. Translation proposals for Forqan

For nahā and its verbal forms, “restrain someone from an action” is a suitable basic equivalent.

In some contexts, “forbid” or “prohibit” is also natural.

For يَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ, “they restrain wrongdoing” is clear.

For تَنْهَىٰ عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ in Al-ʿAnkabūt 29:45, “restrains indecency and wrongdoing” is suitable.

For نَهَى النَّفْسَ عَنِ الْهَوَىٰ in Al-Nāziʿāt 79:40, “restrained the self from desire” is suitable.

For يَتَنَاهَوْنَ in Al-Māʾidah 5:79, “restrain one another” fits the verb’s reciprocal construction. The contextual explanation may also examine the possibility of the people themselves not desisting.

For intahā, “desisted” or “stopped” is suitable.

For muntahūn in Al-Māʾidah 5:91, “those who desist” clarifies morphology; in the full sentence, “Will you then desist?” is more natural.

For al-nuhā in Ṭā Hā 20:54 and Ṭā Hā 20:128, “reason” or “understanding” is suitable. Ulū al-nuhā means “people of understanding.”

For al-muntahā in Al-Najm 53:42, “endpoint and final outcome” is suitable.

For sidrat al-muntahā in Al-Najm 53:14, retaining sidrah-ye muntahā is natural in Persian; the meaning of muntahā should be clarified in the root explanation.

For muntahāhā in Al-Nāziʿāt 79:44, “its endpoint” is suitable.

Forqan’s word box should preserve two independent components.

Brief root meaning: “Reaching an end or limit; restraining the continuation of an action and desisting from it.”

Meaning in the verse: Depending on form and context, this will be “forbidding,” “restraining,” “desisting,” “reason,” or “endpoint and final outcome.”

Using one fixed equivalent for all 56 occurrences would conceal real differences between the derivatives.

10. Conclusion

N H Y in Arabic concerns an endpoint, stopping, and restraining.

Nahā restrains another person from an action.

Intahā expresses desisting or reaching an end.

Tanāhā may concern stopping or mutual restraint, according to context.

Nuhā names reason because reason can assess and restrain wrongful conduct.

Muntahā is likewise an endpoint or final outcome.

The root occurs 56 times in 54 Qur’anic verses.

Its uses concern divine commands, social responsibility, ṣalāh’s restraint, restraining the self from wrongful desire, desisting from usury and hostility, reasoning, and affairs reaching their final outcome.

This range shows that nahy is more than a negative command; it concerns stopping, boundaries, choice, and human responsibility.

The root alone nevertheless cannot determine whether every prohibition is right or wrong.

The Qur’an discusses divine prohibition and restraining wrong, while also reporting hypocrites restraining right and threats demanding that prophets abandon their invitation.

Thus, restraining an action establishes neither its rightfulness nor how it should be carried out.

A prohibition’s rightness concerns the truth of its subject, the evidence, the speaker, and the method.

Ending conduct is also not always a virtue: someone may desist from injustice or abandon truth under threat.

Reason’s role becomes significant in al-nuhā: it helps a person discern when to proceed and when to stop.

Forqan’s translation should therefore distinguish restraining, desisting, reason, and an endpoint.

This distinction preserves the root’s semantic range without confining its varied uses to religious prohibition or a single legal term.